Moehlers (2017) The «multi-stage» contract has several aspects. First, individuals try to agree on their pluralistic moral obligations, to agree on socio-moral rules that everyone can support as a common morality. This object is similar to that of Darwall, Gaus and Southwood. The second-level agreement is appropriate for circumstances in which pluralism is so deep and broad that no common morality can be forged. Instead of moral agents, the parties are re-evaluated as rational supervisory authorities from an instrumental point of view: the objective of this second level is rules of cooperation that promote the interests of all when a deeper moral basis cannot be discovered. If our entrenched problem is not simply to understand what requires morality, but if morality is to be respected or rather seen as superstition based on outdated metaphysical theories, it is obvious that the parties to the agreement should not apply moral judgments in their arguments. Another version of this concern is Gregory Kavkas (1984) Description of the project of reconciling morality and prudence. In both areas, the objective of the Treaty is to show that a commitment to morality is an effective means of promoting non-moral objectives and interests. Here, the legitimate problem is to answer satisfactorily the question «Why be moral?» In a fairly simple sense, this «contractual» project is reductive: it derives from non-moral moral reasons. Or, to use Rawls` terminology, she tries to generate what is reasonable from the rational (1996, 53). After rawls argued that any rational person who inhabits the original position and stands behind the veil of ignorance can discover both principles of justice, Rawls constructed perhaps the most abstract version of a theory of the social contract. This is very abstract, because instead of showing that we would have signed, or even signed, a treaty of foundation of society, it rather shows us what we must be willing to accept as rational people to be limited by justice and therefore be able to live in a well-ordered society.
The principles of justice are more fundamental than the social contract as it has traditionally been conceived. On the contrary, the principles of justice limit this treaty and set the limits of how we can build society. For example, if we view a Constitution as the concrete expression of the social contract, Rawls` two principles of justice are circumscribed, which such a constitution can and cannot require of us. . . .